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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
This Survey focuses on three issues addressed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1993. First, whether a blanket
policy of strip searching misdemeanants violates the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches? Second, what is the correct
method of determining an appropriate version of a foreign sentence
under the Prisoner Transfer Treaty between the United States and Mex-
ico? Third, whether a defendant's interest in access to a child abuse vic-
tim's confidential social service records outweighs the state's legitimate
interest in preserving the confidentiality of those records?
I. STRIP SEARCHING MISDEMEANANTS
A. Background
1. Inspections of the Body
In United States v. Robinson,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that full
body searches incident to custodial arrest are not only an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 2 but that such searches
are "reasonable" under that Amendment.3 The Court also held that such
searches are constitutional even without probable cause that weapons or
evidence may be found. 4 The Court, however, did not hold that all possi-
ble searches of a person's body are permissible. In discussing the search
in Robinson, the Court distinguished the constitutional search in that case
from the unconstitutional search conducted in Rochin v. California.5
1. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally, Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus
"Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127 (analyzing Robinson
and suggesting measures to prevent arbitrary exercise of police power); 2 WAYNE LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEXzuRE": A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(c) (1978 & Supp. 1986)
(discussing search and seizure law). Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989) (arguing that the scope of permissible searches of traffic offenders
needed to be limited).
2. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ... ." U.S. CoNs-r. amend. IV.
3. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
4. The Court rejected the requirement of probable cause for searches incident to law-
ful custodial arrest. The Court stated, "[t]he standards traditionally governing a search inci-
dent to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry standards [referring to
protective frisks for weapons based on reasonable suspicion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)] by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for
which the arrest is made." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Under the Rochin doctrine, government conduct violates due
process when the means used are egregious and "shock the conscience" of the court. Id. at
172.
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In Rochin6 the police forced an emetic into the defendant's stomach
against his will. The emetic caused the defendant to vomit and allowed
the police to recover evidence. The Robinson Court characterized this type
of police conduct as both extreme and abusive and, therefore, in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Court
explicitly recognized that some body searches would be unconstitutional
due to their character. 8
In United States v. Edwards,9 the Court reaffirmed the wide latitude
given to law enforcement officers to search a person after a lawful custo-
dial arrest. The Court, however, left open the possibility that certain
searches "might 'violate the dictates of reason either because of their
number or manner of perpetration.' "10
2. The Bell Balancing Test
In Bell v. Wolfish,1 the Court articulated a test of reasonabieness to be
used under the Fourth Amendment in analyzing the constitutionality of a
search. 12 In Bell the Court derived a balancing test because reasonable-
ness "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application."
13
The Court fashioned a test which balanced the state's need for a search
against the invasion of the searched person's rights. 14 The Court set forth
factors to be considered in determining whether a search is reasonable:
(1) the scope of the intrusion; (2) how the search is conducted; (3) the
justification for initiating it; and (4) the location where the search is con-
ducted. 15 In applying these factors in Bell the Court held that visual body-
cavity searches could be conducted with less than probable cause because
of the security interests of a detention center.' 6
3. Courts' Approaches To Strip Searching Misdemeanants
Blanket policies of strip searches were first condemned in Tinetti v.
Wittke.1 7 In Tinetti, the defendant was arrested for speeding and detained
6. Id.
7. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
8. See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
9. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
10. Id. at 808 n.9 (citing Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1960)).
11. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See generally, Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. R. 1289 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court's
approach to balancing government police power with privacy rights of individuals); Note,
Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313 (1981) (rejecting the concept of
reasonable expectations to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
12. Bell specifically addressed visual body-cavity strip searches of federal pretrial detain-
ees following contact visits. Bel4 441 U.S. at 520. See also David C. James, Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (1982) (analyzing Bell and its
consequences).
13. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 560.
17. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980). For a general
discussion of circuit court cases see, Robin Lee Fenton, Comment, The Constitutionality Of
[Vol. 71:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
in the county jail because he was unable to post bail.18 The defendant was
strip searched according to the jail's blanket policy. The court recognized
a legitimate interest in discovering weapons or contraband, but
concluded:
Unlike pretrial detainees charged with a criminal offense there is
little reason to suspect that traffic violators will conceal contra-
band or weapons. . . . Defendant's blanket strip search policy
cannot be maintained when to do so intrudes into the personal
dignity of traffic violators without any relation to the likelihood
of his concealment .... 19
In Mary Beth G. v. Chicago,20 the Seventh Circuit addressed a blanket
strip search policy for all female detainees in Chicagojails. The defendant
was jailed for not paying parking tickets and strip searched while she
waited for bail money. The Seventh Circuit rejected extending the Robin-
son rationale. 2 1 The court, relying on Bel4 stated that strip searches must
be guided by a test of reasonableness and found that the jail's security
interests did not outweigh the assault on the defendant's privacy.2 2 Addi-
tionally, the court distinguished Mary Beth G. from Bell in three ways: (1)
the Bell detainees were charged with serious federal offenses while the de-
tainees in Mary Beth G. were charged with minor offenses; (2) the Bell de-
tainees were confined longer; and (3) the Bell detainees were strip
searched after contact visits, which could facilitate smuggling of weapons
or contraband.
2 3
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the strip searching of misdemean-
ants in Hill v. Bogans.2 4 In Hil4 the defendant was arrested for a traffic
violation and subsequently strip searched in a lobby with approximately
twelve other people present.2 5 The Tenth Circuit applied the Bell balanc-
ing test and balanced the need for the search against the invasion of the
defendant's privacy rights. 26 The court found that the offenses involved
in Hill were not typically associated with the concealment of weapons or
contraband in a body cavity. After balancing the state's need for the un-
usually invasive search with the defendant's privacy interest, the court held
that the search was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the
circumstances.
27
Policies Requiring Strip Searches of All Misdemeanant and Minor Traffic Offenders, 54 U. CIN. L.
REv. 175 (1985).
18. Tinetti, 479 F. Supp. at 486.
19. Id. at 491.
20. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally, Frank C. Lipuma, Casenotes, Mary Beth
G. v. City of Chicago: How "Reasonable" Can A Strip Search Be?, 18 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 237
(1983).
21. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
22. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.
23. Id. at 1272.
24. 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984).
25. Hil4 735 F.2d at 392-93.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Id. at 394.
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases in 1993
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit extended its earlier ruling in Hill through
two cases: Chapman v. Nichols28 and Cottrell v. Kaysville City.29 In these
cases, the court held that if an officer lacks reasonable suspicion that a
particular misdemeanant is concealing either weapons or contraband,
strip searching is unreasonable under the Bell balancing test and violates
the Fourth Amendment. The privacy of the search, an important factor in
Hil was not determinative for the court in either Chapman or CottrelL
1. Chapman v. Nichols
Four women were arrested for minor traffic violations and subse-
quently confined in the Creek County Jail in Sapulpa, Oklahoma.3 0 The
women were searched pursuant to a blanket strip searching policy of all
jail detainees.3 1 The jail officials acted without reasonable suspicion to
believe that the women were either concealing weapons or contraband on
their persons.3 2 The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
3
against the Sheriff of Creek County, Doug Nichols, both individually and
in his official capacity. 34 In district court both sides moved for summary
judgment.3 5 The district court concluded that the searches were unconsti-
tutional under the established law but that the issue of "whether an 'objec-
tively reasonable' officer could have believed that conducting the search
in private comported with the Fourth Amendment is a question which may
have to be submitted to the jury."36 Sheriff Nichols appealed the denial of
his qualified immunity claim and the plaintiffs appealed the district court
holding that questions of fact regarding the qualified immunity claim
needed to go to the jury.
37
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis with the reason-
ableness test articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.38 The
court noted several undisputed facts: the plaintiffs were arrested for minor
28. 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).
29. 994 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1993).
30. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 394.
31. A female jail employee strip searched each plaintiff in a small laundry room. One
was asked to stand with her hands over her head, one was subjected to a visual inspection of
her pubic area, one was required to bend over and grab her ankles and the last one had to
bend over and pull her underwear down to her ankles and be searched while the door to the
laundry room was open. Id.
32. Id.
33. "Every person who under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects... any
citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured at law .... " 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
34. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 394.
35. The district court denied plaintiff's claim for summary judgment against the sheriff
individually but granted summary judgment against the sheriff in his official capacity. Id. at
395 n.2.
36. Id. at 395
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. This is a balancing test weighing the
.need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."
BelL 441 U.S. at 559.
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traffic violations, no reasonable suspicion existed that these individuals
were likely to be concealing weapons or drugs, and the plaintiffs were strip
searched solely because of the jail's blanket policy.39 The court then
noted that every circuit court, including the Tenth Circuit, has used the
Bell balancing test and under the same circumstances has found such strip
searches unconstitutional.
40
The court, relying on the analysis in Mary Beth G. and Hil4 stated, "a
strip search is an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude."4 1 The
sheriff's contention that the private location of the strip searches distin-
guished this case from previous cases was rejected.42 The court cited
other cases where similar strip searches, found unconstitutional, were con-
ducted in private. 43 The court concluded that it was not objectively rea-
sonable for the sheriff to believe that strip searching minor offense
detainees was constitutional merely because the searches were conducted
in private and were not extensive.
44
Next, the court turned to the principles of qualified immunity.
Under qualified immunity, an official is protected from personal liability if
allegedly unlawful official action was objectively reasonable in light of the
legal rules established at the time of the action. 45 The court observed that
"no circuit case has upheld the grant of qualified immunity when asserted
against a claim based on an across-the-board policy of strip searching mi-
nor offense detainees."4 6 The court affirmed the district court's ruling
that the strip search policy was unconstitutional. The court also held that
the law was clearly established at the time of the illegal searches and that
the sheriff's belief that the policy was constitutional was not objectively
reasonable as a matter of law.
47
2. CottreU v. Kaysville City48
The plaintiff, Lisa Cottrell, brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to recover damages for alleged constitutional violations that oc-
It should be noted that Belldid not involve a search incident to arrest, rather it dealt with
strip searches of pretrial detainees. However, the Bell balancing test provides guidance to
courts on the reasonableness of searches. As the Bell court stated, a balancing test is neces-
sary because reasonableness as a standard "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application." Id.
39. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 395.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The sheriff's position was that because the searches were conducted in private and
did not involve visual body cavity inspections, the unlawfulness of the county's policy was not
apparent. The Court rejected these arguments. Id. at 397-98.
43. See, e.g., Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep't, 849 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1988);
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1986);Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir.
1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 398.
45. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
46. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 398.
47. By characterizing the Sheriff's belief that the policy was constitutional as unreasona-
ble per se, the Tenth Circuit removed it from the jury's purview. This holding effectively
resolved the plaintiffs cross-appeal that the issue should not have gone to the jury. Id. at 399.
48. 994 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1993).
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curred when she was arrested for driving under the influence and strip
searched preceding confinement. 49 Police officers had received informa-
tion that an individual was operating a vehicle while under the influ-
ence. 50 The officers were dispatched and stopped Cottrell.51 The police
asked her to perform roadside tests and the results of those tests were
disputed; the police maintained that she had not performed them satisfac-
torily and the plaintiff maintained that she had.52 The officers arrested
the plaintiff and she allowed them to take a blood sample to prove she was
not intoxicated.5 3 She was strip searched and confined until her parents
posted bond.5 4 The blood test subsequently revealed that the plaintiff had
not been under the influence of alcohol or drugs, except for legal
amounts of the plaintiff's prescription medicine.
55
The district court concluded that under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 56(c) 5 6 the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. 57 The district
court analyzed all of the plaintiff's claims from the single issue of
"whether or not the strip search of the plaintiff violated her Constitutional
rights."58
On appeal, the court noted that the district court's approach did not
deal with each of the plaintiff's claims separately, but dealt with them all
under the strip search analysis.59 The appellate court first addressed the
§ 1983 claims, starting with wrongful arrest.60 The court found that the
district court's holding for summary judgment was error because the rec-
ord contained factual disputes requiring credibility determinations. The
court refused to conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause as
a matter of law to arrest Cottrell. 61
The court next addressed the illegal search claim.62 The court
started by quoting the language of Chapman v. Nichol. 3 that "[t] here can
be no doubt that a strip search is an invasion of personal rights of the first
49. Id. at 731.
50. Id. at 731-32.





56. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings ... show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(c).
57. Cottrel4 994 F.2d at 733.
58. Id. (citing Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 801 F. Supp 572, 574 (D. Utah 1992)).
59. The plaintiff raised numerous claims under § 1983 including wrongful arrest,
wrongful search and seizure, and deliberate indifference to her constitutional fights because
of the city's failure to train the officers. Additional separate claims included false imprison-
ment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 734.
62. Id.
63. 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).
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magnitude."64 The court acknowledged that consistent with Bel465 some
searches incident to lawful arrest may violate Fourth Amendment rights.
The court further supported this view by citing Hill 66 a case factually simi-
lar to Cottrell
The court noted that the officer did not have any reasonable suspi-
cion that Cottrell had drugs, did not conduct a 'pat down search' because
there was no indication that she was carrying any weapons, and did not
believe that Cottrell was a danger to him.67 The court found that these
admissions raised serious doubts about the justification for the strip
search. 68 Additional factors which supported the conclusion that the
search was unconstitutional were that Cottrell was not placed with the gen-
eral jail population 69 and that she wore light summer clothes when ar-
rested. 70 The court concluded that the district court's granting summary
judgment and its assumption that the search actually took place were both
in error.
7 1
C. Analysis of Chapman and Cottrell
Chapman and Cottrell represent an extension, rather than a change, in
existing policy in the Tenth Circuit. The cases stand for the proposition
that the nature, character and circumstances of a strip search are irrele-
vant if the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion is not found for
a particular detainee prior to the search. An across the board policy of
strip searching all misdemeanants evades the necessity of finding reason-
able suspicion that a particular individual is concealing contraband or
weapons. The necessity of finding reasonable suspicion before the police
can conduct a strip search protects both the arrested misdemeanant and
the jail. The arrested misdemeanant, for whom no reasonable suspicion
exists, is protected from the unnecessary degradation that a blanket strip
search policy entails. However, if the jail personnel have articulable rea-
sons why a particular misdemeanant might be concealing contraband or
weapons, the reasonable suspicion standard is not unduly burdensome to
meet. The abrogation of blanket policies simply means that reasonable
suspicion must be developed on a case-by-case basis. This requirement
means additional work for the police but that additional burden is reason-
able when balanced with the rights of the individual that are protected.
64. Id. at 395.
65. Cottrell 994 F.2d at 734 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979)).
66. Cottrel4 989 F.2d at 734 (citing Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984)).
See also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
67. CottreI4 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Appellant's Brief at 119, 130).
68. Cottrel4 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citingJustice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193
(1 lth Cir. 1992) (security and concealed contraband are main reasons for conducting strip
searches).
69. "Courts have consistently recognized a distinction between detainees awaiting bail
and those entering the jail population when evaluating the necessity of a strip search under
constitutional standards." Cottrell, 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d
1437, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)).
70. Cottrell 989 F.2d at 734-35 (citing Hill 735 F.2d at 394 (procedure was unnecessary
because a pat down search would have been sufficient under the circumstances)).
71. Cottrel, 989 F.2d at 735.
1994]
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The Tenth Circuit refused to abide the evasion of the reasonable suspi-
cion requirement and through these cases has indicated that such policies
will be unconstitutional.
In Chapman v. Nichols,7 2 the court made clear that blanket policies of
strip searches for traffic offense misdemeanants will be abrogated. In ad-
dition, the court held that it is unreasonable for law enforcement officers
to believe that such policies might be legal. This ruling strips officials of
qualified immunity and subjects them both personally and officially to lia-
bility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perpetuating blanket strip search poli-
cies. The court's decision focused on the undisputed fact that the police
searched the plaintiffs without individualized reasonable suspicion. The
only articulable reason for strip searching these particular people was the
jail's blanket policy based on security grounds. The court held that the
security rationale was unpersuasive when balanced against the minor of-
fense detainee's privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court
reasoned that minimum security concerns could be met by a less intrusive
pat-down search. The court also held that it was not objectively reasonable
for the sheriff to believe that the blanket policy was lawful because the
strip searches were conducted in private. Indeed, the court noted that the
lack of published cases on this issue is probably due to the fact that other
authorities have sensibly abandoned or declined to establish such
polices.
73
In Cottrell v. Kaysville City,7 4 the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that civil
rights suits by strip searched traffic misdemeanants 75 will not be subjected
to summary judgments favoring the malfeasant officials. These strip
searches, absent particularized reasonable suspicion, will be deemed per
se unconstitutional. In Cottrell, the court focused on factors similar to
those that were relevant in Chapman. The court noted that in a deposition
the officer who directed the strip search said he did not suspect that Cot-
trell had concealed drugs on her person and that he did not conduct a
pat-down search because there was no indication that she had weapons or
was a danger to him.76 Additionally, the court found that considerations
of overall jail security were not applicable because Cottrell was never
placed with the general jail population-she was only waiting for bail.
77
The court also held that less intrusive alternatives to a strip search were
available (namely the pat-down search) and that because Cottrell was wear-
ing light summer clothes, the pat-down search would have been sufficient
to discover any contraband.
With the decisions in Chapman and Cottrell the Tenth Circuit has effec-
tively ended any dispute on the issue of blanket strip searches of all traffic
offense misdemeanants. These two cases are in accord with the other cir-
72. Chapman, 989 F.2d at 393.
73. Id. at 399 (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986)).
74. Cottrel, 994 F.2d at 730.
75. Cottrell occurred in Utah where driving under the influence of alcohol is either a
class A or B misdemeanor. See UTAH CODE ANN § 41-6-44(3)(a)(i),(ii) (1993).
76. Cottrel., 994 F.2d at 734-35.
77. Id. at 735.
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cuits' decisions on the same issue. They effectively end a demeaning prac-
tice that was once widespread and possibly even constitutional under
Robinson's vague directives.
78
II. ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING UNDER THE PRISONER TRANSFER TR.ATY,
A. Background
On November 25, 1976, the United States and Mexico entered into a
bilateral treaty which provided for the transfer of penal sentences.
79
Under this agreement, Mexicans convicted in the United States can be
transferred to prisons in their home states.80 Reciprocally, United States
citizens convicted in Mexico can be transferred to federal prisons in the
United States.8 1 The explicit goal of this treaty is to "render mutual assist-
ance in combating crime... and to provide better administration of jus-
tice by adopting methods furthering the offender's social
rehabilitation .... "82 However, it is generally agreed that another unmen-
tioned reason was congressional concern over the condition of American
prisoners in the Mexican Penal System. 83 Many American prisoners have
alleged that Mexican prison officials tortured them and engaged in
extortion.
84
Although the treaty has improved prisoner treatment abroad, some
officials and scholars have questioned whether such transfers are constitu-
tional.85 The primary reason for concern over prisoner transfer treaties is
that they allow the transferring state to retain jurisdiction over any collat-
eral attacks on the foreign sentence.8 6 The United States effectively defers
to the foreign judgment on its citizen. Implicit to the transfer is the belief
that the foreign system has due process similar to American requirements,
a premise that some reject.87 The state receiving the prisoner is bound to
honor the judgment and sentence of the transferring state. Therefore, a
United States citizen convicted in Mexico and transferred to the United
States can challenge imprisonment, but is estopped by the treaty provi-
sions from challenging the conviction.
88
78. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
79. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex, 28 U.S.T.
7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (entered into force on Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter Transfer Treaty].
80. See Abraham Abramovsky, Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties: An Endangered Species,
24 VAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 456 (1991).
81. Id.
82. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, at 7401.
83. See Abramovsky, supra note 80. See also Ronald M. Emanuel, Note, Intervention of
Constitutional Powers: The Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 2 FLA. J. INT'L L. 203 (1986); Robert D.
Steele, The Impact ofRosada v. Civiletti on U.S. Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 131-
32 (1980).
84. Abramovsky, supra note 80 at 454-55. See also U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Inter-
national Relations, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. at 11-34 and 47-88 (describing the abuse of
U.S. citizens imprisoned in Mexico).
85. Emanuel, supra note 83 at 205.
86. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art. VI, at 7406.
87. Emanuel, supra note 83, at 207-08.
88. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art. VI, at 7406.
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B. Trevino-Casares v. U.S. Parole Commission89
1. Facts
Mr. Trevino-Casares, a United States citizen, was arrested on drug
charges in Mexico on January 13, 1989.90 He was convicted in Mexico and
sentenced to nine years.9 1 Pursuant to the Prisoner Transfer Treaty,92 he
was transferred to the United States on January 31, 1991. 9 3 The United
States Parole Commission determined that Mr. Trevino-Casares would
serve seventy-one months imprisonment and thirty-seven months of super-
vised release. 94 Because of the manner in which the United States Parole
Commission characterized their determination, Trevino-Casares asserted
that he was denied a substantial amount of earned and anticipated service
credits due under 18 U.S.C. § 4105.9 5
Mr. Trevino-Casares appealed the Commission's determination di-
rectly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He
asserted that the Commission erred in two ways: (1) by imposing a sen-
tence longer than the term of imprisonment imposed by Mexico in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (C); 96 and (2) by denying credit
accumulated against his sentence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4105(c) (1).
9 7
2. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The crux of the court's decision is that the Commission, by translat-
ing a foreign sentence into one for domestic enforcement, is in effect act-
ing as a district court.98 The court noted that translating the sentence is
the Commission's duty under 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (A) which states:
The United States Parole Commission shall, without unnecessary
delay, determine a release date and a period and conditions of
supervised release for an offender transferred to the United
States to serve a sentence of imprisonment, as though the of-
fender were convicted in a United States district court of a simi-
lar offense. 99
89. 992 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1069.
91. Id.
92. Transfer Treaty, supra note 79.
93. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1069.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. "The combined periods of imprisonment and supervised release that result from
such determination [referring to the determination of a release date by the U.S. Parole Com-
mission] shall not exceed the term of imprisonment imposed by the foreign court on the
offender." 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(C)(1990).
97. "The transferred offender shall be entitled to all credits for good time, for labor, or
any other credit toward the service of the sentence which had been given by the transferring
country for time served as of the time of the transfer." Id. § 4105(c)(1) (1990).
98. The Court noted that its jurisdiction was limited as to the plaintiff's claims, but
because the two claims had analytical overlap, jurisdiction exited. It rejected the Commis-
sions contention that the appeal was procedurally inappropriate. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at
1069.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (A) (1988).
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The court held that the Commission's translation was, in procedure,
substance, and effect, equivalent to the imposition of a federal sentence by
a district court, and therefore should be treated as such. 10 0 In support of
its holding, the court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (2) (A)10 1 expressly
makes the Commission's determination directly appealable to the circuit
level.' 02 The court exercised its appellate jurisdiction through holding
that the Commission's determination was equivalent to a sentence by a
district court. This crucial holding allowed the court to hear Mr. Trevino-
Casares's first claim-that his sentence was in violation of the law.' 03 Ad-
ditionally, the court's review of the sentencing process was de novo.
0 4
Mr. Trevino-Casares' second claim involved the administration of ser-
vice credits, which was not part of the Commission's duty. Instead, credit
is calculated by the Bureau of Prisons. 105 Because the calculation of credit
involved the execution, rather than the imposition of a sentence, habeas
corpus review was the appropriate remedy for the second claim. 10 6 This
issue created a problem for the court because circuit courts of appeal do
not have original jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions.' 0 7 The
court stated that although it did not have jurisdiction to decide the dis-
pute over the award of credit, the issue did overlap with the sentencing
which was properly within the court's jurisdiction.1
0 8
The next matter the court discussed was how to arrive at a proper
sentence for the petitioner. The proper length of the sentence was deter-
mined by the Commission to be one hundred eight months, commensu-
rate with the Mexican sentence of nine years. 109 The Commission did
reduce the petitioner's imprisonment to seventy-one months, followed by
thirty-seven months of supervised release, because he suffered permanent
physical damage due to abuse while in Mexican custody.
1 10
After determining that one hundred eight months was the appropri-
ate sentence, the court examined how the Commission characterized its
sentence and what effect that characterization had on the Bureau of Pris-
ons calculation of credit. The court found that the "Commission, evi-
dently with the full agreement of the Bureau of Prisons, denies its § 4106A
100. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1069.
101. This section states, "The court of appeals shall decide and dispose of the appeal in
accordance with section 3742 of this title [referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3742] as though the deter-
mination appealed had been a sentence imposed by a United States district court." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4106A(b) (2) (B) (1990).
102. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
103. The Court's jurisdiction is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (1988) which autho-
rizes appeal of sentences imposed in violation of the law.
104. United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349, 351 (10th Cir. 1991)(legal conclusions in
sentencing reviewed de novo, with due deference accorded application of law to underlying
facts).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
106. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
107. Noriega-Sandoval v. U.S. I.N.S., 911 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
109. The sentencing guidelines, as applied by the Commission, would yield a result of
121-151 months for this offense, but pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.1 the maximum 108 month
Mexican sentence was adopted. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1070.
110. Id. at 1071.
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determination the status of a sentence for purposes of § 4105, leaving the
Bureau of Prisons nothing but the effectively superseded foreign sentence
to subtract the offender's service credits from."
1 1
The court determined that the Commission's interpretation was erro-
neous and held, instead, that the service credits should be subtracted from
the Commission's determination of time that the prisoner must remain
imprisoned in the United States.1 12 In support of this view, the court
noted that two express congressional commands were incorporated into
the statute.' 13 The first command was that the domestic sentence, includ-
ing both confinement and supervised release, may not exceed the length
of imprisonment imposed by the foreign state. 114 The second was that
transferred prisoners must receive the same treatment as other inmates
with respect to their domestic confinement.
1 5
The court concluded its opinion with an explanation of why its inter-
pretation was proper even in light of the deferential standard accorded to
administrative review. First, the statutes leave almost no ambiguity on the
issue of treatment of transferred prisoners. Second, even if ambiguity ex-
ists, the court has a duty to decide whether the Commission had advanced
a permissible construction of the statutes. In regard to the second issue,
the court stated that "the Commission's construction is both internally in-
consistent and impermissibly at odds with the evident intent of the statu-
tory scheme."
1 16
The court affirmed the Commission's determination of the length
and composition of petitioner's sentence and modified the legal status of
the Commission's determination of the sentence. This modification ne-
cessitated the application of service credits by the Bureau of Prisons; cred-
its which had previously been barred. The case was then ordered
transferred to the district court for a determination of the proper applica-
tion of credit pursuant to a habeas corpus review.
11 7
3. Analysis
In Trevino-Casares v. U.S. Parole Commission," 8 the Tenth Circuit was
primarily involved in statutory construction and interpretation of congres-
sional intent. The court's interpretation of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty
between the U.S. and Mexico also played a large role in the decision-mak-
ing process.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1071-72.
113. Id.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b) (1) (C) (1988). See also Transfer Treaty, supra note 79, Art.
V(3) at 7406.
115. "[A] [transferred] offender.., shall remain in the custody of the Attorney General
under the same conditions and for the same period of time as an offender who had been
committed to the custody of the Attorney General by a court of the United States ... . 18
U.S.C. § 4105(a) (1988).
116. Trevino-Casares, 992 F.2d at 1073.
117. The circuit court did not have original jurisdiction to determine the application of




The first difficult issue was whether jurisdiction existed for the court
to hear the claim. The court wisely decided, after considering the statu-
tory context, to treat the Commission's sentencing conversion as the legal
equivalent of a domestic sentence imposed by a district court. This inter-
pretation of the Commission's role was augmented by 18 U.S.C.
§ 4106A(b) (2) (A), which makes the Commission's determination directly
appealable to the circuit level. Therefore, the court's treatment of the
foreign sentence conversion as a domestic sentence issued by a district
court is logical and consistent with the express statutory language.
Some critics may argue that the court overstepped its authority in not
reviewing the administrative agency's decision under the normally defer-
ential arbitrary and capricious standard. However, in apparent anticipa-
tion of this point, the court noted that the statutory framework left almost
no ambiguity on the treatment of transferred prisoners. In essence, the
Commission had very little to interpret on its own initiative-Congress ex-
pressly set out its mandate. The court also noted that, even when ambigu-
ity does exist, courts have the authority to decide whether the
administrative agency has advanced a permissible construction of the stat-
utes. In answering the later question, the court characterized the Com-
mission's construction as inconsistent and contrary to Congress's express
intent.
Through this case, the court struck down the U.S. Parole Commis-
sion's convoluted interpretation of their statutory mandate to translate
foreign sentences into domestic sentences. Prior to Trevino, transferred
prisoners in the Tenth Circuit were denied earned service credits when
their foreign sentence was converted into a domestic sentence by the
Commission. Because the Commission refused to acknowledge that their
translation was a "sentence," the Bureau of Prisons had nothing to sub-
tract the prisoners acquired service credits from. The court replaced the
Commission's practice with a cogent interpretation of the relevant statutes
and treaty that accords well with the congressional intent, as revealed
through the statutory language.
The court's interpretation reconciles the treaty and statutes.1 19 More
importantly, the interpretation formulated by the Tenth Circuit treats
both prisoners sentenced domestically and by Mexican authorities the
same in regard to the application of service credits. Because of Trevino,
the Commission's translations will now be considered a sentence to which
the Bureau of Prisons must apply earned service credits. This decision is
more equitable than what existed under the Commission's prior interpre-
tation, where foreign sentenced prisoners were denied earned service
119. An alternate construction of the statutes and treaty was propounded recently by the
Fifth Circuit. See Cannon v. United States Dep't. ofJustice Parole Comm'n, 961 F.2d 82 (5th
Cir. 1992) (imposition of shorter sentences is also precluded because only the transferring
state has jurisdiction to modify sentences of its courts). See also Thorpe v. United States Pa-
role Comm'n, 902 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990) (Commission does not impose a sentence, it
merely sets a release date).
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credits and effectively had to serve more time than their domestic
counterparts.
III. EXLINE v GuNT"R.32 0 IN CAMERA REVIEW OF SOCIAL SERVICE
RECORDS REQUIRED IN ACCORD WITH PENNSYLVANIA V.
RI7cHzE. 12 1
A. Background
In prosecutions for sexual assaults on children, one of the most criti-
cal issues is the reliability of the victim-the child witness. Information on
the child's reliability is extremely important to the defendant's case; how-
ever, access to crucial social service agency records may be hampered by
state confidentiality laws.
1 22
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,123 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987,
is the seminal case on defendants' rights of access to records protected by
state confidentiality laws. In Ritchie, a state agency, the Pennsylvania Chil-
dren and Youth Services ("CYS"), had investigated children on an anony-
mous report of abuse. The files on this investigation were kept
confidential pursuant to Pennsylvania's statutory scheme.1 2 4 After the in-
vestigation, George Ritchie, the father of the children, was prosecuted for
rape, incest, and other sexual offenses against his twelve year old
daughter. 125
Ritchie attempted to subpoena the CYS file to help his defense. He
believed that the file might contain medical records, inconsistent state-
ments by his daughter or other exculpatory information. 126 CYS refused
to allow him access to the file, citing the Pennsylvania confidentiality stat-
ute. 12 7 The trial court refused to grant Ritchie access to the records in
dispute and Ritchie was subsequently convicted. 12 8 On appeal, however,
120. 985 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1993).
121. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
122. For information on the reliability and credibility of child witnesses see Jean Mon-
toya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child
Witnesses, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 927 (1993); Steven Penrod et al., Special Issue on Child Sexual Abuse:
Children as Observers and Witnesses: The Empirical Data, 23 FAM. L.Q. 411 (1989); Therese L.
Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal
Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 175 (1991); Robin W. Morey,
Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?
40 U. MtAMI L. REV. 245 (1985).
123. 480 U.S. at 39. For a general discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion see Chris Hutton, Confrontation, Cross-examination and Discovery: A Bright Line Appears after
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 33 S.D. L. REV. 437 (1988); Note, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term Lead-
ing Cases, 101 HARv. L. REv. 119 (1987). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
opinion see PennyJ. Rezet, Note, Criminal Procedure-Balancing Sixth Amendment Rights with the
Victim's Right to Confidentiality-Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1986).
124. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. II § 2215(a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1987), providing that CYS files
are confidential and access is permissible only to courts "of competent jurisdiction pursuant
to a court order" (recodified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. XXIII § 6340 (a)(5) (Purdon 1991)).
125. The prosecution stemmed from events unconnected with the initial CYS investiga-
tion. See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 159 (Pa. 1985).
126. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id. at 44.
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the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned the conviction 129 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed.1 30 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment required allowing Ritchie's attorney access to the confidential child
abuse records compiled by CYS.1
3 1
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
order requiring full disclosure to Ritchie's attorney. In a plurality opin-
ion, the Court held that the right of confrontation secured by the Sixth
Amendment was only a trial right.1 3 2 The right of confrontation did not
allow pretrial discovery of confidential documents because discovery was
not part of the "trial."1 33 The plurality held that the Sixth Amendment's
confrontation clause merely guaranteed "an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."
13 4
The Court used a due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment instead of relying on the Sixth Amendment. It held that evidence
which was important to the defense could not be suppressed without viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 5 The plurality decision further
held that an appropriate remedy would be for the trial court to review the
files in camera.13 6 If, after review, the trial court concluded there was a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different, then a
new trial should be granted with all material evidence released to the
defendant.137
In Ritchie, the Court balanced the state of Pennsylvania's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of CYS files with defendants' rights to have
access to evidence material to their defense.' 3 8 Had the Court rested its
decision on the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, a broad discov-
ery right would have been created. The right to access under the Sixth
Amendment would have been unfettered and would have subsumed the
state's confidentiality interest.13 9 Through its reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court crafted a more narrowly tai-
lored remedy. The trial judge would conduct the in camera review and
determine what information was to be released. The Court decided this
129. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
130. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 149 (Pa. 1985).
131. Id. at 153 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI.).
132. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52.
133. Id. at 53.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 56.
136. Id. at 60.
137. Id. at 57 (citing U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
138. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60-61.
139. "To allow full disclosure to defense counsel . . . would sacrifice unnecessarily the
Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information.... Neither
precedent nor common sense require such a result." Id. at 60-61.
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mechanism would properly balance the confidentiality interests with the
right to access.
140
B. Exline v. Gunter'
4 1
1. Facts
Larry Exline was convicted in October 1986 in the El Paso County
District Court of one count of sexual assault on a child. 142 On appeal,
Exline argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow discovery of
the victim's social service child abuse records. 143 The Colorado Court of
Appeals ruled that Exline had failed to make the required offer of proof
for the records and that the denial did not violate his constitutional right
of confrontation.144 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction 145 and
the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
14 6
After the denial of certiorari by the Colorado Supreme Court, Exline
filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. 147 Exline claimed
that the trial court should have reviewed the social service records in cam-
era, and that its refusal to do so violated his rights under the due process
and confrontation clauses. 1 48 .
The federal district court agreed with Exline and held that Exline's
right to due process was violated. The court then ordered the El Paso
County District Court to conduct an in camera review of the social service
records to determine whether they contained information that may have
been necessary to Exline's defense.
1 49
On October 10, 1991 the state court issued its certificate of compli-
ance, as required by the federal district court.' 50 In the certificate, the
state court asserted that it had provided Exline with access to a juvenile
dependency and neglect file. The state court found that Exline had failed
to examine this file and make the required showing of "particularized
need" for the social service records at issue. 151 The court also found, after
conducting the in camera review, that four documents in the social service
records may have been necessary to the defense. 152 However, the state
court further held that Exline's failure to show particularized need obvi-
ated the need for any remedial action in his favor by the court.153
The federal district court, after reviewing the certificate of compli-
ance, ordered the state court to conduct an in camera review of the
140. Id. at 60.
141. 985 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 488.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 488 (citing People v. Exline, 775 P.2d 48 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)).










records and determine whether any documents "probably would have
changed the outcome of Exline's trial," and, if so, he was to be granted a
new trial.154 However, if the nondisclosure of the information was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt then the state court was not required to
take any further action.' 55 The federal district court relied on the holding
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie156 to fashion its remedy for the due process viola-
tion. The State of Colorado appealed the federal district court's ruling to
the Tenth Circuit.
2. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit's decision adhered closely to the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.15 7 The court upheld both the
federal district court's ruling that Exline's due process rights had been
violated and the federal district court's Ritchie-derived remedy. In arriving
at its decision, the court made a variety of comparisons between Ritchie
and Exline. First, the court explained that the facts of Ritchie were similar
to the instant case because both defendants were charged with similar of-
fenses. In both Ritchie and Exline, the defendants made offers of proof that
the social service child abuse records were relevant and necessary to their
defense. 158 In Ritchie, the defendant argued that he should have access to
the records because they might contain the names of favorable witnesses
or other exculpatory evidence.1 59
The court agreed with the federal district court's finding that Exline's
offer of proof was equally as strong as the one in Ritchie, if not more spe-
cific. 16° Exline's offer of proof stated: "[A]nything in those ... reports
relating to credibility ... would be crucial to the defense ... they should
be produced to the Court and then let the court decide.., which ones we
would be entitled to."1 61
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the applicable Colorado law that al-
lows access by a court to otherwise confidential child abuse records. After
reviewing Colorado Revised Statutes § 19-10-115(1) (a), (2)(a), (2)(f),1
6 2
154. Id. at 488-89.
155. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58.
156. Extine, 985 F.2d at 488.
157. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39.
158. Extine, 985 F.2d at 489.
159. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 44 (1987)).
160. Extine, 985 F.2d at 490.
161. Id.
162. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(1)(a)(1986) states that records of child abuse in Colo-
rado, "[e]xcept as provided in this section ... shall be confidential and shall not be public
information."
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(2)(1986) details the agencies which can gain access to
confidential child abuse records. Subsection (a) provides that law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors investigating abuse reports may have access. Most important to the Tenth Cir-
cuit were the provisions of subsection (2) (f) allowing access:
A court, upon its finding that access to such records [referring to confidential child
abuse records, as defined in section (1) (a)] may be necessary for determination of
an issue before such court, but such access shall be limited to in camera inspections
unless the court determines that public disclosure of the information contained
therein is necessary for the resolution of an issue then pending before it....
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the court concluded that the statutes explicitly provided that the state dis-
trict court could conduct in camera reviews of such records if necessary.
In furtherance of the view that the Ritchie and Exline cases were not distin-
guishable on statutory grounds, the court commented that the Colorado
statute which governed Exline's request was similar to the Pennsylvania
statute involved in Ritchie.
163
As additional support the court cited Hophinson v. Shillinger,164 in
which the Tenth Circuit had previously held that "although a defendant
could not point to specific exculpatory information in records he had
never seen, he was entitled to an in camera inspection of those records
under Ritchie."
165
In concluding its opinion, the Tenth Circuit used language that dis-
paraged the state district court's recalcitrant behavior towards the federal
district court's orders.1 66 The court sternly stated that after the case was
returned to the state court for the in camera review, "the state court was
not asked to determine whether it should or should not review the social
service record, and it was not asked to re-interpret what had occurred at
the time of the original hearing .... [T] he state court has yet to make the
findings required by Pennsylvania v. Ritchie."
167
3. Analysis
The court closely compared the facts of Exline to Ritchie. The court
compared the offenses, the statutory schemes and the offers of proof
made in both cases and concluded that the cases were not distinguishable
on any of these substantive grounds.
The State of Colorado, however, argued that Exline's habeas corpus
petition should have been dismissed because he failed to show particular-
ized need for the social service records. The Tenth Circuit could have
used this narrow interpretation of "need" to deny Exline's habeas relief.
Instead, the court found that Exline's offer of proof was more particular-
ized than that offered in Ritchie. The court took an expansive view of the
fights propounded in Ritchie and granted Exline relief, refusing to reverse
this case on irrelevant nuances and cosmetic differences.
The federal district court had held that Exline's due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the state trial court's
refusal to conduct the in camera review required by Ritchie. Specifically,
Exline was denied the right of access to documents under the control of
the state's social service agency. Exline had a right to social service docu-
ments that could have had a material impact on his defense, even those
protected by a confidentiality statute. Under the remedy created by
Ritchie, it was the trial court's duty to conduct an in camera review and
COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-115(2)(f) (1986).
163. Extine, 985 F.2d at 490.
164. 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989).
165. Exiine, 985 F.2d at 490-91.




determine whether any of the documents in question were material. The
state trial court's refusal to review the documents, and later its obstinate
refusal to rule whether its nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, initially denied Exline this crucial access and later denied him
a new trial with access to the material documents.
The U.S. Supreme Court crafted the proper remedy in Ritchie. The
Tenth Circuit correctly applied that remedy in Exline. The Tenth Circuit
directed the state district court to determine whether the records con-
tained information that likely would have changed the outcome of Ex-
line's trial. If the state trial court had found that the outcome would have
been the same, or that the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, then no further remedial action on Exline's behalf was neces-
sary. If the state trial court held otherwise, Exline deserved a new trial.
For the Tenth Circuit to have ordered the trial court to do otherwise,
would have amounted to a subversion of Ritchie-a temptation which the
court wisely resisted.
CONCLUSION
During 1993, the Tenth Circuit brought its law on blanket strip search
policies into conformity with the majority of the other circuits. Chapman
and Cottrell removed any ambiguity about the unconstitutionality of these
blanket policies. Trevino-Casares was used by the Tenth Circuit as a vehicle
for reforming the calculations made by the United States Parole Commis-
sion and the Bureau of Prisons in translating foreign sentences into do-
mestic sentences. The Tenth Circuit construed ambiguous statutory and
treaty provisions and created a feasible framework for sentencing transla-
tion. This framework, drawn from discordant statutory and treaty lan-
guage, is cogent and seems to fit the discernible legislative goals. In Exline,
the circuit closely followed the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ritchie and
relied on a due process analysis as the basis for access to confidential social
service child abuse records.
One commonality among these cases was the Tenth Circuit's guarded
view of governmental power. First, the circuit curtailed the ability of po-
lice to conduct strip searches of misdemeanants. Second, the circuit inter-
preted the Prisoner Transfer Treaty and benefitted transferred prisoners
who had previously been denied credit against their domestic sentences.
Finally, the circuit limited the ability of state governments to maintain the
absolute confidentiality of child abuse records.
Jeffrey C. Feischner
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